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INTERPRETATION AND RECTIFICATION IN 
AUSTRALIA  
 
 Both interpretation and rectification continue to pose problems. 
Difficulties are compounded by blurring the boundary between the two. In 
Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation [2016] HCA 47 the 
High Court of Australia overturned the decisions of the lower courts which had 
held that performance bonds could be interpreted in a “loose” manner in order 
to correct a mistake. However, the documents could be rectified in order to 
reflect the actual intentions of the parties. This decision should be welcomed: 
the mistake was more appropriately corrected through the equitable jurisdiction 
than at common law. Significantly, the concurring judgments of French C.J. and 
Kiefel J. highlight that the law of rectification now seems to be different in 
Australia than in England. It is to be hoped that the English approach will soon 
be revisited (see further P. Davies, “Rectification versus Interpretation” [2016] 
C.L.J. 62). 
 Nebax Constructions Australia Pty Ltd (“Nebax”) entered into a contract 
with the New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation (“the Corporation”) 
for the demolition and construction of certain buildings. Under the contract, 
Nebax was obliged to obtain from the Australian and New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd (“ANZ”) two unconditional performance bonds in favour of the 
Corporation. This would entitle the Corporation to require ANZ to pay it a total 
of $146,965.06 upon a written demand. Unfortunately, Mr Simic, a director of 
Nebax, gave to Ms Hanna, an employee of ANZ, the wrong details. Instead of 
the favouree of the bonds being “New South Wales Land and Housing 
Corporation, with the Australian Business Number (“ABN”) 24 960 729 253”, 
which corresponded to the Corporation, the bond was in favour of “New South 
Wales Land & Housing Department trading as Housing NSW ABN 45 754 121 
940”. That was a mistake. In fact, there was not, and has never been, any 
government department called the “New South Wales Land & Housing 
Department”, and the ABN was also clearly incorrect. 
 Three years after the contract had been entered into, the Corporation 
sought payment under each bond from ANZ. The Bank refused to pay, since the 
Corporation was not the named favouree. The first question was whether the 
bonds should be interpreted such that “New South Wales Land & Housing 
Department trading as Housing NSW ABN 45 754 121 940” could be read as 
meaning “New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation, with the ABN 24 
960 729 253”. This would appear to alter the words chosen by the parties. 
Nevertheless, this was acceptable to both Kunc J. at first instance and the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal, which emphasised the context surrounding the 
performance bonds: their purpose was to fulfil the underlying contractual 
obligations of Nebax towards the Corporation, and favouree of the bonds should 
be understood to be the same as the counterparty to the underlying contract – in 
other words, the Corporation. 
 The High Court firmly rejected such a “loose approach to construction” 
(at [11] per French C.J.). As French C.J. clearly explained in his concurrence, 
two complementary principles apply to performance bonds: the principle of 
strict compliance and the principle of autonomy. The latter demands that the 
performance bond be interpreted independently, and should not be qualified by 
reference to the terms of the underlying contract: the bank should be able to rely 
upon the language of the bond alone, without investigating the underlying the 
contract. Further burdens should not be placed on banks which issue 
performance bonds. The former principle requires the bond to be interpreted 
strictly, such that the bank only has an obligation to pay – and can only claim an 
indemnity for its performance – if the conditions on which the bank is 
authorised and compelled to make payment are strictly observed. This is 
important. The joint judgment of Gageler, Nettle and Gordon JJ. explains that a 
bank is contractually bound to adhere to the terms of a bond; by paying a party 
not named on the face of the instrument the bank may be exposed to claims for 
breach of contract. It is therefore understandable why ANZ did not pay the 
Corporation on demand.  
 The significance of context and the “factual matrix” within which an 
agreement is concluded is a controversial subject. The lower courts in Simic 
considered the relevant background material to include the underlying 
agreement, and felt able to interpret a term of the contract other than in 
accordance with its plain meaning. The High Court sensibly refused to endorse 
such a liberal approach towards interpretation. The nature and function of 
performance bonds demands a strict approach towards interpretation. It is 
suggested that a strict approach should also be favoured more generally, and 
that English law appears to be moving in this direction too (see e.g. Arnold v 
Britton [2015] UKSC 36; [2015] A.C. 1619; Lord Sumption, “A Question of 
Taste: The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of Contracts” (Harris Society 
Annual Lecture, 8 May 2017) https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
170508.pdf). Minor “typos” may be corrected in the interpretative exercise, but 
substantial mistakes – such as that made in Simic – are best corrected via the 
equitable remedy of rectification. 
 In Simic, the performance bonds were agreed between Nabax and ANZ in 
favour of the Corporation. When deciding whether to rectify the bonds, the 
High Court rightly focussed on the intentions of Nabax (through Mr Simic) and 
ANZ (through Ms Hanna). Mr Simic was clearly mistaken, since he intended 
the favouree of the bonds to be the Corporation. It seems appropriate to 
conclude that Ms Hanna had a similar intention that the bonds reflected what 
was required under the underlying contract. After all, if someone had pointed 
out to Mr Simic and Ms Hanna that the name of the counterparty was wrong 
straight away, then both parties would surely have agreed immediately. It 
follows that the performance bonds did not reflect the parties’ actual intentions 
due to a common mistake, and rectification was granted.  
 In rectifying the performance bonds, the High Court applied the 
traditional test for rectification on the basis of common mistake. The written 
instrument was made to conform to the true agreement of the parties, and that 
agreement does not need to be specifically enforceable. Interestingly, both 
French C.J. and Kiefel J. in their separate concurring judgments commented on 
the different approach towards rectification developing in England. In 
Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd. [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 A.C. 
1101 Lord Hoffmann, obiter, suggested (at [59]-[60]) that “the terms of the 
contract to which the subsequent instrument must conform must be objectively 
determined in the same way as any other contract”, and that “the question is 
what an objective observer would have thought the intentions of the parties to 
be”. As the concurring judgments illustrate, this is a departure from traditional 
equitable principle which concentrates on the parties’ actual intentions. It is 
difficult to see why an earlier objective accord should trump a later, formal 
agreement unless the written instrument fails to reflect the parties’ actual 
intentions. Moreover, Lord Hoffmann’s approach surprisingly allows a court to 
find a common mistake because a reasonable person would consider that one 
party was mistaken, even if one party was not actually mistaken at all (cf. 
Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd. [2007] EWHC 409 (Ch); [2007] 1 
All E.R. (Comm) 1083 at [138]–[164] (Briggs J.)). 
 The approach in Simic reflects the traditional approach to rectification; 
both French C.J. and Kiefel J. were clear that the views of Lord Hoffmann in 
Chartbrook involve a departure from that approach. Both Justices said that 
Australia should not follow this aspect of Chartbrook without full argument in a 
case where the issue was relevant to the outcome. This is sensible, and it is 
suggested that Lord Hoffmann’s approach should not be endorsed in any event. 
Indeed, even in England Lord Hoffmann’s approach has given rise to much 
controversy, and a number of judges have been moved to express strong views 
in extra-judicial speeches and articles (for a sample, see Davies [2016] C.L.J. 
62, fn. 6). It is to be hoped that this issue will be considered fully by an 
appellate court in this jurisdiction as well. In Chartbrook, Lord Hoffmann’s 
views on rectification were obiter, and in Daventry District Council v Daventry 
& District Housing Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 1153; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1333 Lord 
Hoffmann’s approach regarding rectification was not contested. This is 
problematic. As French C.J. rightly observed (at [18]), “[a]t a conceptual level, 
construction and rectification of a contract are different processes”.  
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